In this paper, we develop a specification methodology that documents and specifies a cache coherence proto- 
cache coherence protocol must detail the actions of each of these components for every combination of state it could be in and event that could happen. For example, it must specify the actions performed by a cache controller that has Exclusive access to a cache block when a Get Shared request for that block arrives from another node, and it must specify the new state that the cache controller enters.
What is protocol verification? Verification of a cache coherence protocol involves proving that a protocol specification obeys a desired memory consistency model, such as sequential consistency (SC) [17] . To verify that a protocol satisfies a coherence protocol requires proving that it obeys certain invariants about what value a load from memory can return. For example, to satisfy SC, the loads and stores from the different processors must appear to the programmer to be in some total order where (a) the value of a load equals the value of the most recent store to the same address in the total order, and (b) the total order respects the program order at each of the processors.
Why is verification difficult?
At a high level, protocols can be represented as in Figure 1 , which illustrates the specification of a cache controller for a three state (Modified, Shared, Invalid) protocol. There are a handful of states, with atomic transitions between them. Since, at a high level, cache coherence protocols are simply finite state machines, it would appear at first glance that it would be easy to specify and verify a common three state (MSI) broadcast snooping protocol.
Unfortunately, at the level of detail required for an actual implementation, even seemingly straightforward protocols have numerous transient states and possible race conditions that complicate the tasks of specification and verification. For example, a single cache controller in a "simple" MSI protocol that we will specify in Section 2.1 has 11 states (8 of which are transient), 13 possible events, and 21 actions that it may perform.
The other system components are similarly complicated, and the interactions of all of these components are difficult to specify and verify.
Why is verification important?
Rigorous verification is important, since the complexity of a low-level, implementable protocol makes it difficult to design without any errors. Many protocol errors can be uncovered by simulation. Simulation with random testing has been shown to be effective at finding certain classes of bugs, such as lost protocol messages and some deadlock conditions [27] . However, simulation tends not to be effective at uncovering subtle bugs, especially those related to the consistency model. Subtle consistency bugs often occur only under unusual combinations of circumstances, and it is unlikely that un-directed (or random) simulation will drive the protocol to these situations. Thus, systematic and perhaps more formal verification techniques are needed to expose these subtle bugs.
Verification requires a detailed, low-level specification. Systematic verification of an implementable cache coherence protocol requires a low-level, detailed specification of the entire protocol. While there exist numerous verification techniques, all of these techniques seek to show that an implementable specification meets certain invariants. Verifying an abstract specification only shows that the abstract protocol is correct.
For example, the verification of a high-level specification which omits transient states may show that invariants hold for this abstraction of the protocol, but it will not show that an implementable version of this protocol obeys these invariants.
Current specifications are not sufficient. Specifications that have been published in the literature have not been sufficiently detailed for implementation purposes, and they are thus not suitable for verification purposes. In academia, protocol specifications tend to be high-level, because a complete low-level specification may not be necessary for the goal of publishing research [4, 7, 13] . Moreover, a complete low-level specification without a concise format does not lend itself to publication in academia. In industry, low-level, detailed specifications are necessary and exist, but, to the best of our knowledge, none have been published in the literature. These specifications often match the hardware too closely, which complicates verification and limits alternative implementations but eliminates the problem of verifying that the implementation satisfies the specification.
A new table-based specification technique that is sufficient for verification.
To address the need for concise low-level specifications, we have developed a table-based specification methodology. For each system component that participates in the coherence protocol, there is a table that specifies the component's behavior with respect to a given cache block. As an illustrative example, Table 1 shows a specification for a simplified atomic cache controller.
The rows of the table correspond to the states that the component can enter, the columns correspond to the events that can occur, and the entries themselves are the actions taken and resulting state that occur for that combination of state and event. The actions are coded with letters which are defined below the table. For example, the entry a/S denotes that a Load event at the cache controller for a block in state I causes the cache controller to perform a Get Shared and enter state S.
This simple example, however, does not show the power of our specification methodology, because it does not include the many transient states possessed by realistic coherence protocols. For simple atomic protocols, the traditional specification approach of drawing up state transition diagrams is tractable. However, non-atomic transactions cause an explosion in the state space, since events can occur between when a request is issued and when it completes, and numerous transient states are used to capture this behavior.
Section 2 illustrates the methodology with a more realistic broadcast snooping protocol and a multicast snooping protocol [5] .
A methodology for proving that table-based specifications are correct. Using our table-based specification methodology, we present a methodology for proving that a specification is sequentially consistent, and we show how this methodology can be used to prove that our multicast protocol satisfies SC. Our method uses an extension of Lamport's logical clocks [16] to timestamp the load and store operations performed by the protocol. Timestamps determine how operations should be reordered to witness SC, as intended by the designer of the protocol. Thus, associated with any execution of the augmented protocol is a sequence of timestamped operations that witnesses sequential consistency of that execution. Logical clocks and the associated timestamping actions are, in effect, a conceptual augmentation of the protocol and are specified using the same table-based transition tables as the protocol itself. We note that the set of all possible operation traces of the protocol equals that of the augmented protocol, and that the logical clocks are purely conceptual devices introduced for verification purposes and are never implemented in hardware. We consider the process of specifying logical clocks and their actions to be intuitive for the designer of the protocol, and indeed the process is a valuable debugging tool in its own right.
A straightforward invariant of the augmented protocol guarantees that the protocol is sequentially consistent.
Namely, for all executions of the augmented protocol, the associated timestamped sequence of LDs and STs is consistent with the program order of operations at all processors and the value of each LD equals that of the most recent ST. To prove this invariant, numerous other "support" invariants are added as needed. It can be shown that all executions of the protocol satisfy all invariants by induction on the length of the execution.
This involves a tedious case-by-case analysis of each possible transition of the protocol and each invariant.
To summarize, the strengths of our methodology are that the process of augmenting the protocol with timestamping is useful in designing correct protocols, and an easily-stated invariant of the augmented protocol guarantees sequential consistency. However, our methodology also involves tedious case-by-case proofs that 
Specifying Broadcast and Multicast Snooping Protocols
In this section, we demonstrate our protocol specification methodology by developing two protocols: a broadcast snooping protocol and a multicast snooping protocol. Both protocols are MSI (Modified, Shared, Invalid) and use eight tables to document and specify:
• the states, events, actions, and transitions of the cache controller
• the states, events, actions, and transitions of the memory controller
The controllers are state machines that communicate via queues, and events correspond to messages being processed from incoming queues. The actions taken when a controller services an incoming queue, including enqueuing messages on outgoing queues, are considered atomic.
Specifying a Broadcast Snooping Protocol
In this section, we shall specify the behavior of an MSI broadcast snooping protocol.
System Model and Assumptions
The broadcast snooping system is a collection of processor nodes and memory nodes (possibly collocated) connected by two logical networks (possibly sharing the same physical network), as shown in Figure 2 .
A processor node contains a CPU, cache, and a cache controller which includes logic for implementing the The memory space is partitioned among one or more memory nodes. It is responsible for responding to coherence requests with data if it is the current owner (i.e., no processor node has the block Modified). It also receives writebacks from processors and stores this data to memory.
The two logical networks are a totally ordered broadcast network for address messages and an unordered unicast network for data messages. The address network supports three types of coherence requests: GETS (Get-Shared), GETX (Get-Exclusive) and PUTX (Dirty-Writeback). Protocol transactions are address messages that contain a data block address, coherence request type (GETX, GETS, PUTX), and the ID of the requesting processor. Data messages contain the data and the data block address.
All of the components in the system make transitions based on their current state and current event (e.g., an
incoming request), and we will specify the states, events, and transitions for each component in the rest of this section. There are many components that make transitions on many blocks of memory, and these transitions can happen concurrently. We assume, however, that the system appears to behave as if all transitions occur atomically.
Network Specification
The network consists of two logical networks. The address network is a totally ordered broadcast network.
Total ordering does not, however, imply that all messages are delivered at the same time. For example, in an asynchronous implementation, the path to one node may take longer than the path to another node. The address network carries coherence requests. A transition of the address network is modeled as atomically transferring an address message from the output queue of a node to the input queues of all of the nodes, thus inserting the message into the total order of address messages. 
FIGURE 2. Broadcast Snooping System
The data network is an unordered point-to-point network for delivering responses to coherence requests. A transition of the data network is modeled as atomically transferring a data message from the output queue of a node to the input queue of the destination node.
All nodes are connected to the networks via queues, and all we assume about these queues is that address queues from the network to the nodes are served in FIFO order. Data queues and address queues from the nodes to the network can be served without this restriction. For example, this allows a processor node's GETX to pass its PUTX for the victim block.
CPU Specification
A transition of the CPU occurs when it places a LD or ST in the Mandatory queue, places a Prefetch in the Optional queue, or removes data from the LD/ST data queue. It can perform these transitions at any time.
Cache Controller Specification
In When the GETS arrives, the state becomes S.
Events at the cache controller depend on incoming messages. The events are listed and described in Table 3 .
Note that, in the case of Replacements, block B refers to the address of the victim block. The allowed cache controller actions are listed in Table 4 . Cache controller behavior is detailed in 
Memory Node Specification
One of the advantages of broadcast snooping protocols is that the memory nodes can be quite simple. The memory nodes in this system, like those in the Synapse [9] , maintain some state about each block for which this memory node is the home, in order to make decisions about when to send data to requestors. This state includes the state of the block and the current owner of the block. Memory states are listed in Table 6 , events are in Table 7 , actions are in Table 8 , and transitions are in Table 9 .
Specifying a Multicast Snooping Protocol
In this section, we will specify an MSI multicast snooping protocol with the same methodology used to describe the broadcast snooping protocol. Multicast snooping requires less snoop bandwidth and provides Occurs when we observe our own GETS request in the global order address of transaction at head of incoming address queue
Own GETX
Occurs when we observe our own GETX request in the global order same as above
Own PUTX
Occurs when we observe our own PUTX request in the global order same as above
Other GETS
Occurs when we observe a GETS request from another processor same as above
Other GETX
Occurs when we observe a GETX request from another processor same as above
Other PUTX
Occurs when we observe a PUTX request from another processor same as above
Data
Data for this block from the data network address of data message at head of incoming data queue higher throughput of address transactions, thus enabling larger systems than are possible with broadcast snooping.
System Model and Assumptions
Multicast snooping, as described by Bilir et al. [5] , incorporates features of both broadcast snooping and directory protocols. It differs from broadcast snooping in that coherence requests use a totally ordered multicast address network instead of a broadcast network. Multicast masks are predicted by processors, and they must always include the processor itself and the directory for this block (but not any other directories), yet they are allowed to be incorrect. A GETS mask is incorrect if it omits the current owner, and a GETX mask is incorrect if it omits the current owner or any of the current sharers. This scenario is resolved by a simple directory which can detect mask mispredictions and retry these requests (with an improved mask) on behalf of the requestors.
The multicast snooping protocol described here differs from that specified in Bilir et al. in a couple of significant ways. First, we specify an MSI protocol here instead of an MOSI protocol. Second, we specify the protocol here at a lower, more detailed level. Third, the directory in this protocol can retry requests with incorrect masks on behalf of the original requester.
A multicast system is shown in Figure 3 . The processor nodes are structured like those in the broadcast snooping protocol. Instead of memory nodes, though, the multicast snooping protocol has directory nodes,
which are memory nodes with extra protocol logic for handling retries, and they are also shown in Figure 3 .
In the next two subsections, we will specify the behaviors of processor and directory components in an MSI multicast snooping protocol. 
Network Specification
The data network behaves identically to that of the broadcast snooping protocol, but the address network behaves slightly differently. As the name implies, the address network uses multicasting instead of broadcasting and, thus, a transition of the address network consists of taking a message from the outgoing address queue of a node and placing it in the incoming address queues of the nodes specified in the multicast mask, as well as the requesting node and the memory node that is the home of the block being requested (if these nodes are not already part of the mask).
Address messages contain the coherence request type (GETS, GETX, or PUTX), requesting node ID, multicast mask, block address, and a retry count. Data messages contain the block address, sending node ID, destination node ID, data message type (DATA or NACK), data block, and the retry count of the request that triggered this data message.
CPU Specification
The CPU behaves identically to the CPU in the broadcast snooping protocol.
Cache Controller Specification
Cache controllers behave much like they did in the broadcast snooping protocol, except that they must deal with retried and nacked requests and they are more aggressive in processing incoming requests. This added complexity leads to additional states, TBE fields, protocol actions, and protocol transitions.
There are additional states in the multicast protocol specified here due to the more aggressive processing of incoming requests. 
FIGURE 3. Multicast Snooping System
for data to go to M, and will then go to I immediately (except for in cases in which forward progress issues require the processor to perform a LD or ST before relinquishing the data, as will be discussed below). There are also three additional states that are necessary to describe situations where a processor sees a nack to a request that it has seen yet.
There are four additional fields in the TBE: ForwardProgress, ForwardID, RetryCount, and ForwardIDRetryCount. The ForwardProgress bit is set when a processor sees its own request that satisfies the head of the Mandatory queue. This flag is used to determine when a processor must perform a single load or store on the cache line before relinquishing the block. count associated with the block that will be forwarded to the node specified by ForwardID.
We use the same table-driven methodology as was used to describe the broadcast snooping protocol. Tables   10, 11 , 12, and 13 specify the states, events, actions, and transitions, respectively, for processor nodes.
Directory Node Specification
Unlike broadcast snooping, the multicast snooping protocol requires a simplified directory to handle incorrect masks. A directory node, in addition to its incoming and outgoing queues, maintains state information for each block of memory that it controls. The state information includes the block state, the ID of the current owner (if the state is M), and a bit vector that encodes a superset of the sharers (if the state is S). The possible block states for a directory are listed in Table 14 . As before, we refer to M, S and I as stable states and others as transient states. Initially, for all blocks, the state is set to I, the owner is set to memory and the bit-vector is set to encode an empty set of sharers. The state notation is the same as for processor nodes, although the state MX A refers to the situation in which a directory is in M and receives data, but has not seen the corresponding coherence request yet and therefore does not know (or care) whether it is PUTX data or data from a processor that is downgrading from M to S in response to another processor's GETS.
A directory node inspects its incoming queues for the address and data networks and removes the message at the head of a queue (if any). Depending on the incoming message and the current block state, a directory may inject a new message into an outgoing queue and may change the state of the block. For simplicity, a directory currently delays all requests for a block for which a PUTX or downgrade is outstanding.
The directory events, actions and transitions are listed in Tables 15, 16, and Table 17 , respectively. The action 'z' ("delay transactions to this block") relies on the fact that a directory can delay address messages for a given block arbitrarily while waiting for a data message. Conceptually, we have one directory per block. Since there is more than one block per directory, an implementation would have to be able to delay only those transactions which are for the specific block. Note that consecutive GETS transactions for the same block could be coalesced. 
Verification of Snooping Protocols
In this section, we present a methodology for proving that a specification is sequentially consistent, and we show how this methodology can be used to prove that our multicast protocol satisfies SC. Our method uses an extension of Lamport's logical clocks [16] to timestamp the load and store operations performed by the protocol. Timestamps determine how operations should be reordered to witness SC, as intended by the designer of the protocol. Logical clocks and the associated timestamping actions are a conceptual augmentation of the protocol and are specified using the same table-based transition tables as the protocol itself. We note that the set of all possible operation traces of the protocol equals that of the augmented protocol.
The process of developing a timestamping scheme is a valuable debugging tool in its own right. PUTX from owner at head of incoming address queue.
same as above
PUTX (requestor is not owner)
PUTX from non-owner at head of incoming address queue.
Data
Data message at head of incoming data queue address of message at head of incoming data queue progress bit, roughly to ensure that OP can indeed be timestamped so that it appears to occur just after the ("earlier") time of the GETX, and that this OP's logical timestamp also respects program order.
In brief, our methodology for proving sequential consistency consists of the following steps.
• Augment the system with logical clocks and with associated actions that assign timestamps to LD and ST operations. The logical clocks are purely conceptual devices introduced for verification purposes and are never implemented in hardware • Associate a global history with any execution of the augmented protocol. Roughly, the history includes the configuration at each node of the system (states, TBEs, cache contents, logical clocks, and queues), the totally ordered sequence of transactions delivered by the network, and the memory operations serviced so far, in program order, along with their logical timestamps.
• Using invariants, define the notion of a legal global history. The invariants are quite intuitive when expressed using logical timestamps. It follows immediately from the definition of a legal global history that the corresponding execution is sequentially consistent.
• Finally, prove that the initial history of the system is legal, that each transition of the protocol maps legal global histories to legal global histories, and that the entries labelled "impossible" in the protocol specification tables are indeed impossible. It then follows by induction that the protocol is sequentially consistent.
The first step above, that of augmenting the system with logical clocks, can be done hand in hand with development of the protocol. Thus, it is, on its own, a valuable debugging tool. The second step is straightforward.
It is also straightforward to select a core set of invariants in the third step that are strong enough to guarantee that the execution corresponding to any legal global history is sequentially consistent. The final step of the proof methodology above requires a proof for every transition of the protocol and every invariant, and may necessitate the addition of further invariants to the definition of legal. This step of the proof, while not difficult, is certainly tedious.
In the rest of this section, we describe the first three steps of this process in more detail, namely how the multicast protocol is augmented with logical clocks, and what is a global history and a legal global history. We include examples of the cases covered in the final proof step in Appendix A.
Augmenting the System with Logical Clocks
In this section, we shall describe how we augment the system specified earlier with logical clocks and with actions that increment clocks and timestamp operations and data. These timestamps will make future definitions (of global states and legal global states) simpler and more intuitive. These augmentations do not change the behavior of the system as originally specified.
The Augmented System
The system is augmented with the following counters, all of which are initialized to zero:
• One counter (global pulse number) associated with the multicast address network.
• Two counters (global and local clocks) associated with each processor node of the system.
• One counter (pulse number) added to each data field and to each ForwardID field of each TBE.
• One counter (pulse number) field added to each data message.
• One counter (global clock) associated with each directory node of the system.
Behavior of the Augmented System
In the augmented system, the clocks get updated and timestamps (or pulses) are assigned to operations and data upon transitions of the protocol according to the following rules.
Network: Each new address transaction that is appended to the total order of address transactions by the network causes the global pulse number to increment by 1. The new value of the pulse number is associated with the new transaction.
Processor: Tables 18 and 19 describe how the global and local clocks are updated. The TBE counter is used to record the timestamp of a request that cannot be satisfied until the data arrives. When the data arrives, the owner sends the data with the timestamp that was saved in the TBE.
Directory: Briefly, upon handling any transaction, the directory updates its clock to equal the global pulse of that transaction. The pulse attached to any data message is set to be the value of the directory's clock.
Global Histories
The global history associated with an execution of the protocol is a 3-tuple <TransSeq,Config,Ops>. TransSeq records information on the sequence of transactions requested to date: the type of transaction, requester, address, mask, retry-number, pulse (possibly undefined), and status (successful, unsuccessful, nack, or undetermined). Config records the configuration of the nodes: state per block, cache contents, queue contents, TBEs, and logical clock values. Ops records properties of all operations generated by the CPUs to date:
operations along with address, timestamp (possibly undefined), value, and rank in program order. 
Legal Global Configurations and Legal Global Histories
There are several requirements for a global history <TransSeq,Config,Ops> to be legal. Briefly, these are as follows. The first requirement is sufficient to imply sequential consistency. The remaining four requirements supply additional invariants that are useful in building up to the proof that the first requirement holds.
• Ops is legal with respect to program order. That is, the following should hold: • TransSeq is legal. To describe the type of constraints that TransSeq must satisfy, we introduce the notion • Ops is legal with respect to Trans-Seq. Intuitively, for all operations op in Ops, if op is performed by processor N at global timestamp t, then the A-state for processor N at logical time t should be either S or M and should be M if op is a ST.
• Config is legal with respect to TransSeq. This involves several constraints, since there are many components to Config. For example, if processor N is in state IS AD for block B, then a GETS for block B, requested by N, with timestamp greater than that of N (or undefined) should be in TransSeq.
• Config is legal with respect to Ops. That is, for all blocks B and nodes N, the following should hold: 
Properties of Legal Global Histories
It is not hard to show that the global history of the system is initially legal. The main task of the proof is to show the following:
Theorem 1: Each protocol transition takes the system from a legal global history to a legal global history.
To illustrate how Theorem 1 is proved, we include in Appendix A the proof of why the transition at each entry of 
Related Work
We focus on papers that specify and prove a complete protocol correct, rather than on efforts that focus on describing many alternative protocols and consistency models, such as [1, 10] . There is a large body of literature on the subject of formal protocol verification 4 which we have classified into a taxonomy along two independent axes: automation and completeness [23] . We distinguish verification methods based on the level of automation they support: manual, semi-automated or automated. Manual methods involve humans who read the specification and construct the proofs. Semi-automated methods involve some computer programs (a model checker or theorem prover) which are guided by humans who understand the specification and provide the programs with the invariants or lemmas to prove. Automated methods take the human out of the loop and involve a computer program that reads a specification and produces a correctness proof completely automatically. We also distinguish techniques that are complete (proof that a system implements a particular consistency model) from those that are incomplete (proof of coherence or selected invariants). Table 20 provides a summary of our taxonomy. We discuss each column of the table separately below. Lazy & snoopy caching [14] Incomplete method RMO testing [19] , Origin2000 coherence [8] , S3.mp coherence [22] , FLASH coherence [20] , Alpha 21264/21364 [3] , HP Runway testing [11, 18] Manual techniques: Lazy caching [2] was one of the earliest examples of a formal specification and verification of a protocol (lazy caching) that implemented sequential consistency. The authors use I/O automata as their formal system models and provide a manual proof that a lazy caching system implements SC. Their use of history variables in the proof is similar to the manner in which we use Lamport Clock timestamps in our proofs. Gibbons et al. [12] provide a framework for verifying that shared memory systems implement relaxed memory models. The method involves specifying both the system to be verified as well as an operational definition of a memory model as I/O automata and then proving that the system automaton implements the model automaton. As an example, they provide a specification of the Stanford DASH memory system and manually prove that it implements the Release Consistency memory model. Our table-based specification methodology is complementary in that it could also be used to describe I/O automata.
Our previous papers [25, 21, 6, 15] specified various shared memory systems (directory and bus protocols)
at a high level, and employed manual proofs using our Lamport Clocks technique to show that these systems implemented various memory models (SC, TSO, Alpha). This paper is our latest effort which demonstrates our technique applied to more detailed table-based specifications of snooping protocols. Shen and Arvind [24] propose using term rewriting systems (TRSs) to both specify and verify memory system protocols.
Their verification technique involves showing that the system under consideration and the operational definition of a memory model, when expressed as TRSs, can simulate each other. This proof technique is similar to the I/O automata approach used by Gibbons et al. [12] . Both TRSs and our table-based specification method can be used in a modular and flexible fashion. A drawback of TRSs is that they lack the visual clarity of our table-based specification. Although their current proofs are manual, they mention the possibility of using a model checker to automate tedious parts of the proof.
Semi-automated techniques: Park and Dill [19] provide an executable specification of the Sun RMO memory model written in the language of the Murϕ model checker. This language, which is similar to a typical imperative programming language, is unambiguous but not necessarily compact. They use this specification to check the correctness of small synchronization routines. Eiriksson and McMillan [8] describe a methodology which integrates design and verification where common state machine tables drive a model checker and generators of simulators and documentation. The protocol specification tables they describe were designed to be consumed by automated generators rather than by humans, and they do not describe the format of the text specifications generated from these tables. They use the SMV model checker (which accepts specifications in temporal logic) to prove the coherence of the protocol used in the SGI Origin 2000. However, the system verified had only one cache block (which is sufficient to prove coherence, but not consistency). Pong et al. [22] verify the memory system of the Sun S3.mp multiprocessor using the Murϕ and SSM (Symbolic State Model) model checkers, but again the verified system had only one cache block and thus cannot verify whether the system satisfies a memory model. Park and Dill [20] express both the definition of the memory model and the system being verified in the same specification language and then use "aggregation" to map the system specification to the model specification (similar to the use of TRSs by Shen and Arvind [24] and I/O automata by Gibbons et al. [12] ). As an example, they specify the Stanford FLASH protocol in the language of the PVS theorem prover (the language is a typed high-order logic) and use this aggregation technique to prove that the "Delayed" mode of the FLASH memory system is sequentially consistent. Akhiani et al. [3] summarize their experience with using TLA+ (a form of temporal logic) and a combination of manual proofs and a TLA+ model checker (TLC) to specify and verify the Compaq Alpha 21264 and 21364 memory system protocols. Although they did find a bug that would not have been caught by simulation or model checking, their manual proofs were quite large and only a small portion could be finished even with 4 people and 7 person-months of effort. The TLA+ specifications are complete and formal, but they are both nearly two thousand lines long. Nalumasu et al. [11, 18] propose an extension of Collier's ArchTest suite which provides a collection of programs that test certain properties of a memory model. Their extension creates the effect of having infinitely long test programs (and thus checking all possible interleavings of test programs)
by abstracting the test programs into non-deterministic finite automata which drive formal specifications of the system being verified. Both the automata and the implementations were specified in Verilog and the VIS symbolic model checker was used to verify that various invariants are satisfied by the system when driven by these automata. The technique is useful in practice and has been applied to commercial systems such as the HP PA-8000 Runway bus protocol. However, it is incomplete in that the invariants being tested do not imply SC (they are necessary, but not sufficient).
Automated techniques: Henzinger et al. [14] provide completely automated proofs of lazy and a certain snoopy cache coherence protocol using the MOCHA model checker. Their protocol specifications (with the system being expressed in a language similar to a typical imperative programming language and the proof requirements expressed in temporal logic) are augmented with a specification of a "finite observer" which can reorder protocol transactions in order to produce a witness ordering which satisfies the definition of a memory model. They provide such observers for the two protocols they specify in the paper. However, the general problem of verifying sequential consistency is undecidable and such finite observers do not exist for the protocols we specify in this paper or in the protocols used in modern high-performance shared-memory multiprocessors.
To the best of our knowledge, there are no published examples of a completely automated proof of correctness of a system specified at a low level of abstraction.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have developed a specification methodology that documents and specifies a cache coherence protocol in eight tables: the states, events, actions, and transitions of the cache and memory controllers.
We have used this methodology to specify a detailed, low-level three-state broadcast snooping protocol with an unordered data network and an ordered address network which allows arbitrary skew. We have also presented a detailed, low-level specification of the Multicast Snooping protocol [5] , and, in doing so, we have shown the utility of the Intuitively, the definition of a legal transaction sequence rules out sequences that do not make sense. For example, a GETX on block B in which the mask does not include all processors that "currently" may have Shared or Modified access to B should not be successful. By "currently," we are referring to a moment in which all transactions occurring before the GETX to block B in the transaction sequence are completed, and no further transactions are yet handled. We use an A-state vector to record the type of access each processor may have to a given block upon completion of a sequence of transactions. The A-state vector for block B has P elements, each of which is either Invalid, Shared, or Modified. Also, throughout the appendix, we denote an entry of the transaction sequence as a tuple <Trans,Mask,RetryNum,Pulse,Status>, where Trans is a triple denoting the requester, address, and transaction type (GETX, GETS, or PUTX) and the meaning of the remaining entries of the tuple should be clear from the description in Section 3.2.
We first define the notion of a determined legal transaction sequence and its associated A-state. Here, determined simply refers to the fact that the outcomes of all transactions in the sequence have been determined to be success, failure or nack.
• The empty sequence () is a determined legal transaction sequence with associated A-state vectors A = <I, I, ..., I> for each block.
• In what follows, suppose that a determined legal transaction sequence of length at least t is fixed and a block B is fixed. Let A be the A-state for block B associated with the prefix of this transaction sequence of length t. Then we say that the A-state of processor i at time t is A i and we denote it by A i (t).
A.2 Cache Controller Transitions map legal histories to histories with legal transaction sequences.
Each entry of Table 22 points to the proof of why the transition at the corresponding entry of Table 13 (cache controller transition specification), maps a legal global history, <TransSeq,Ops,Config>, to a new global history, <TransSeq',Ops',Config'> in which TransSeq' is legal. As usual, the transition is done by node N on block B, and we assume that the logical time of N (in Config) is t.
a) In this case, processor N's state is I, S, or M. By construction of the protocol, Tables 12 and 13 , actions f, g, or p, a transaction T is issued with TYPE GETS, GETX, or PUTX. By action a, the retry number must be 0. Therefore, TransSeq' = TransSeq, T, where T=<<B,TYPE,N>,M,0,UNDEFINED,UNDE-TERMINED>.
For each condition of the definition of a legal transaction sequence, we list the reasons why TransSeq' satisfies that condition. Throughout, we denote the determined legal prefix of TransSeq by TransSeq D ; note that this is also the determined prefix of TransSeq'. 
